Babies are born with limited abilities to move around the world or to manipulate objects in it. They wave their arms and legs, and they curl their hands into fists when their palms are touched. But they cannot find their way anywhere, or use any of the astonishing number of tools invented by their forebears. How does this situation change? How do infants become adults who can navigate through unfamiliar territory and who can not only use but invent tools? Why will some infants become adults who are exceptionally skilled at these activities, while other infants will grow into the sort of adults who constantly get lost, or who put together a bookshelf backwards—the kind of people who refer to themselves deprecatingly as “not good with maps” or “not a do-it-yourself person”? And how can we maximize the spatial skills of the population to help meet the demands of a technological society, both for people who are fascinated by spatial challenges and wish to augment their abilities, and for those who are the future klutzes?

These seemingly simple questions disguise a territory of much greater complexity, characterized by substantial disagreement and fractionation. To take outright disagreement first, considerable debate has centered on the nature of normative development. Do infants develop into competent adults in a protracted course of development propelled by interactions with the physical environment (as Piaget thought)? Or do they develop due to social interactions, linguistic input, and apprenticeship in the use of cultural tools such as maps or the use of star systems (as Vygotsky thought)? Or are they actually equipped from the beginning with core knowledge of objects and space, later augmented by the acquisition of human language (as
argued in the past few decades by Spelke)? The long history of arguments on these theoretical issues has been reviewed by Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2000, 2006; see also Newcombe, 2002a). Newcombe and Huttenlocher have proposed an overarching perspective on spatial development called adaptive combination theory that unites the important insights of constructivism, Vygotskyanism and nativism, while discarding some of the least tenable propositions of each. In terms of developmental theory, the adaptive combination framework is an example of neoconstructivism (see chapters in Johnson, 2009b and in Woodward & Needham, 2009; Newcombe, 2002b, 2009). In terms of spatial cognition, the adaptive combination framework is an example of Bayesian theories (see Cheng, Shettleworth, Huttenlocher & Rieser, 2007). One purpose of this chapter is to offer an overview of issues involved with how to characterize the typical course of spatial development. Because the Piagetian and Vygotskyan frameworks have been previously reviewed in some detail (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000), we focus on why adaptive combination is to be preferred to a core-knowledge approach.

Disagreement can be distressing, but fractionation (lack of any talk at all as opposed to disagreement and heated debate) is arguably worse. Lack of engagement ensures a lack of progress. Such lapses in communication have been seen in the field of spatial development in several ways. First, there is a gulf dividing researchers interested in normative development from researchers interested in individual differences. These researchers work in communities that do not speak much to each other and that use different methods and statistical techniques—experiments and analysis of variance in the study of normative development, and psychometric tests and correlational techniques in the study of individual differences. The two research communities even concentrate on different aspects of spatial cognition. Newcombe (2002a) divided her review of spatial cognition into two main areas, navigation and mental rotation. The
study of normative development has concentrated largely on navigation (with some exceptions), beginning in infancy with the study of search for objects hidden in the environment. In contrast, the study of individual differences (again with some exceptions) has largely focused on mental rotation and other skills that center on mental manipulation of objects. However, more than 50 years after Lee Cronbach called for uniting the “two disciplines of scientific psychology” (Cronbach, 1957), we have started to see significant progress in integrating the study of normative development with the study of the development of individual differences.

There is a second fractionation, stemming in part from the difficulties in connecting research on normative functioning with research on individual differences. Lack of a coordinated approach has limited the ability of research on spatial development to contribute to the solution of applied and educational issues, notably how to foster the development of the spatial skill increasingly required in a complex technological society. However, again there is the beginning of good news. More than 40 years after George Miller issued his call to “give psychology away” (Miller, 1969), we have started to see significant attention to using our understanding of spatial development to help people realize their full potential in spatial tasks (Kastens et al., 2009; Liben, 2006; National Research Council, 2006).

A third fractionation involves a splintering rather than a gulf. A gulf divides two sides—makes halves. Splintering makes multiple islands—fractions smaller than halves. Research in spatial development has often proceeded with insufficient attention to research in areas that are close to it—spatial functioning in adults is one example, the decline of spatial functioning in the elderly is another example, the development and use of spatial language is yet another. In addition, there is significant research on spatial cognition in non-human animals (comparative research); neuroscience on a variety of levels with a variety of techniques used with a variety of
species; computer science and artificial intelligence (for example, the task of programming a robot that can navigate on its own has proved to be a formidable but interesting challenge); geography and the other spatial sciences. Each of these fields has something to contribute to the overall puzzle, but evolving on separate islands, the fields have (like Darwin’s finches) developed differently, with nomenclatures that are not mutually intelligible and other barriers to interdisciplinary dialogue. While this chapter cannot take on the task of a full interdisciplinary survey (see Waller and Nadel’s (in press) edited volume for such a survey), we endeavor to use insights from comparative research, computer science and neuroscientific investigation as needed to illuminate normative development, individual differences and translational impact.

This chapter begins with placing spatial cognition in a context that makes clear why we should care about it (*The Whys and Wherefores of Spatial Development*). In this section, we introduce the distinction between two sub-domains of spatial skill: skills related to navigation (where are objects in relation to each other) and skills related to tool-making (representing individual objects and ways to transform them). We will then discuss what spatial development is the development of (*The Whats of Spatial Development*). This section expands on the typology offered in the first section, involving a key distinction between skills supporting navigation and skills supporting tool making. The section also touches on many issues that relate to the study of individual differences and our ability to assess them. We next offer an overview of the recent study of spatial development (*The Nature of Normative Development in Early Spatial Behavior*), concentrating on the contrast between the Spelke and Kinzler (2007) core knowledge perspective and the view of spatial development advanced by Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2000, 2006; see also Newcombe, 2002a). The relevant literature for this section largely centers on infancy and early childhood, and mostly concerns behavior in small-scale spaces that are directly experienced...
rather than presented symbolically using maps or spatial language. When we turn to examine the
development of symbolic means of spatial representation (Spatial Symbols and Spatial
Development), we switch attention in doing so to older children and to larger-scale spaces. This
section is a long one, covering the use of spatial language, the use of maps and models, and the
use of gesture in reasoning about space. In our last section, we turn attention briefly to how to
use what we know about spatial development to have translational impact on increasing spatial
skills, and on reducing sex and SES differences in spatial skills (How to Use What We Know).
Aiming for translational impact necessarily involves engagement with the sources and nature of
individual differences.

The Whys and Wherefores of Spatial Development

There are many reasons to be interested in spatial development. First, human spatial
cognition plays a central role in our species’ evolution, adaptation, and current everyday
functioning. Second, spatial skills are a key component of human intellect, and hence need to be
incorporated in any successful model of the architecture of the human mind. Third, there is
growing evidence that spatial skills are specifically relevant to success in science, technology,
engineering and mathematics (STEM) disciplines.

Two Kinds of Spatial Skill and Their Evolutionary Significance

There are two spatial challenges faced by our species. The first challenge is widely
shared across the animal kingdom: how can we move successfully around the world? The second
challenge is a more species-specific one: how can we manipulate objects in our world to make
and use the tools which constitute such a vital part of our adaptive specialization?

Navigation. Being able to move around the world allows mobile animals to search for
food, water and mates. But mobility comes with a price tag—animals that move need to keep
track of where they are, and must be able to return to a home base, to rejoin conspecifics, and to avoid danger. Different species solve these problems in different ways, depending on their environmental affordances and adaptive pressures. Survey knowledge is easier to obtain for animals that fly, chemical gradients may be more vital underwater, a magnetic sense may be especially crucial for migratory species, and so on. Humans do not fly, lack keen chemical senses, and are not able to sense the earth’s magnetic field. Indeed, in unfamiliar environments when the sun is not shining, humans are prone to walking in circles (Souman, Frissen, Sreenivasa & Ernst, 2009). However, our abilities to represent the spatial environment and to navigate in it are luckily strengthened by the symbolic ability in which we excel. We can draw maps, describe space in language, and invent systems of navigation using the stars, or technology such as the compass, the astrolabe and (now) the GPS. One of the fascinating aspects of research in spatial cognition is the opportunity to put human navigation in cross-species perspective (see Jacobs & Schenk, 2003; Shettleworth, 2009). Navigation depends on the representation of the position of objects and environmental features with respect to each other, and the positioning of a moving self within this landscape. The same representations allow us to find hidden objects.

Object representation and manipulation. Another kind of spatial challenge involves the representation of the shape and internal structure of objects (considered independently of their position with respect to other objects or a frame of reference) and the ability to transform that representation by imagining the object’s structure being rotated, sliced through, or changed by folding, melting, or the application of a force (e.g., hammering). These kinds of spatial skill are the ones mostly assessed by psychometric tests. Skills of this kind appear to be typical of humans but seem not to be widely shared among other species, including non-human primates (Burmann, Dehnhardt & Mauck, 2005; Köhler, Hoffmann, Dehnhardt & Mauck, 2005;
Okamoto-Barth & Call, 2008). The ability to transform the internal structure of objects may, in fact, underlie the human capacity for tool-making, an adaptive characteristic that is distinctive to our species (Baber, 2003), even though some other species may share it, e.g., there are reports of tool use in crows (Kenward, Weir, Rutz & Kacelnik, 2005).

**Current challenges.** These two abilities—the ability to represent and transform the environmental landscape and the ability to represent and transform internal object structure—both have adaptive significance. But they are not just relics of an evolutionary past. Even with GPS, humans are challenged to find their way around novel environments as they travel and explore. And we still need to put together furniture (“some assembly required”) and puzzle out how best to pack things into defined spaces. Interestingly, some of us even do these activities for pleasure—orienteering, road rallies, and geocaching test our navigational skills, while jigsaw puzzles and Rubik’s cubes challenge our ability to transform object structure.

**Spatial Skill in the Structure of Human Intellect**

A second reason to be interested in spatial development is that spatial functioning likely forms a vital part of the structure of human intellect. Three examples drawn from different research traditions illustrate this point: decades of factor analytic research showed that visualization is a well-defined component skill within general intelligence (Carroll, 1993); spatial intelligence was one of the types of intelligence proposed in multiple-intelligence theory (Gardner, 1983); approaches to working memory have distinguished between verbal working memory and the visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 1986). There is controversy about some of these matters: for example, see McGrew (2009) for an update on developments in the psychometric approach to the structure of intellect; Waterhouse (2006) for a critique of the theory of multiple intelligences; and Kane, Hambrick, Tuholski, Payne, Engle and Wilhelm
(2004) for evidence that domain-specificity may characterize short-term memory but not working memory. Nevertheless, although we have yet to define the architecture of the human mind/brain, there is strong reason to believe that spatial functioning will be a relevant element in this architecture.

**The Practical Significance of Spatial Skill**

On the practical and policy side, spatial ability appears to be relevant to people’s interest in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), and their ability to succeed in STEM disciplines. Many short-term correlational studies have demonstrated these kinds of correlations, but often without excluding reverse causality (taking science courses improves spatial ability) or third-variable causation (people who are generally smart are also good at spatial tests, and smart people often like science and math). Recently, however, analyses of large longitudinal data sets have shown that spatial ability predicts choice of STEM majors and careers, even after controlling for important third variables such as verbal and mathematical ability, and even when spatial ability is measured in early adolescence while the STEM outcomes occur decades later (Shea, Lubinski & Benbow, 2001; Wai, Lubinski & Benbow, 2009; Webb, Lubinski & Benbow, 2007). In analyses of Project Talent data (the same data set analyzed by Wai et al., 2009), Hedges and Chung have even shown these effects after controlling for interest in STEM subjects in high school, thus strongly implicating a causal connection between spatial ability and STEM careers (Hedges, personal communication).

Additionally to these analyses of large data sets, there are well-controlled correlational studies that indicate a relation of spatial ability to success in training for specific careers that seem to demand spatial reasoning, such as dentistry (Hegarty, Kehner, Khooshahbe & Montello, 2009), surgery (Wanzel et al., 2002), and other disciplines (see Hegarty & Waller,
We also know from recent fine-grained studies of physics problem solving that spatial visualization is related to better ability to interpret graphs and solve problems in kinematics (Kozhevnikov, Motes & Hegarty, 2007). Furthermore, intervention to increase spatial skill in prospective engineering majors who test relatively low as they enter the major increases chances of completing an engineering degree (Sorby, 2009). Thus, overall, we have good reason to believe that spatial ability is causally relevant to STEM interest and success. Because efforts to improve spatial ability are known to be successful (see meta-analyses by Baenninger & Newcombe, 1989; Hand et al., under review), we also have good reason to be optimistic about our ability to increase interest in STEM disciplines and people’s ability to succeed in mathematics, science and engineering.  

An important unanswered question is whether the spatial representations and abilities that support navigation are related to STEM interest and achievement. To date, it is only within-object spatial encoding and transformation (e.g., mental rotation) that have been assessed in relation to STEM. We know virtually nothing about whether the ability to represent the environment and navigate within it is related to STEM. This gap in our knowledge is difficult to solve as yet, because we lack a good way to assess individual differences in between-object representations and transformations. We need a testing method that is short enough and cheap enough to use in longitudinal studies with large samples.

Section Summary

Spatial development is of interest for evolutionary, theoretical and applied reasons. From an evolutionary point of view, we suggest that there are two distinct sets of spatial skills, inter-object representations and processes relevant to navigation, and intra-object representations and processes relevant to tool making. Both kinds of spatial skill remain relevant today, and intra-
object spatial skills are known to relate longitudinally to success in the STEM disciplines. A successful account of human intellect and its development must take spatial functioning into account.

**The Whats of Spatial Development**

We have made the case that spatial development is interesting from both a theoretical and a practical point of view. But what is spatial development the development of? We have distinguished navigation and tool making as functions with adaptive value. In doing so, we focus attention on the distinction between representations of relations among environmental features (as required for navigation) and representations of within-object structure (as required for tool making). (See Chatterjee, 2008, for a fuller discussion of this distinction.)

**Why Distinguish Navigation from Object Transformations?**

The value of dividing spatial skill into these two spheres is supported by several lines of empirical research on perspective taking (a task on the navigation side) and mental rotation (a task on the tool-making side). First, while imagining walking around the object or array (perspective taking) and imagining an object or an array of objects rotating (mental rotation) are computationally equivalent—one task could be turned into the other one with ease by a computer programmer—it has been repeatedly found that the two tasks are influenced by different factors: in some circumstances, one task is more difficult, and in other circumstances the other task is more difficult (Creem, Wraga & Profitt, 2001; Huttenlocher & Presson, 1973, 1979; Simons & Wang, 1998; Wraga, Creem & Profitt, 2000; Wraga, Creem-Regehr & Profitt, 2004). Second, analyses of individual differences show that people who are good at mental rotation are not necessarily good at perspective taking and vice versa (Hegarty & Waller, 2004; Kozhevnikov & Hegarty, 2001). Third, mental rotation and perspective taking tasks have different neural bases.
(Wraga, Shephard, Church, Kosslyn & Inati, 2005), and, importantly from the point of view of the tool making function, mental rotation is frequently (though not always) found to involve activation of motor areas relevant to the hands (Wraga, Thompson, Alpert & Kosslyn, 2003).

Fourth, in support of and extending the third point, neuroscientific investigation suggests that inter-object and intra-object representations and transformations are generally supported by very different brain areas, as are the terms in spatial language that relate to those representations and transformations (Chatterjee, 2008). Thus, there is ample reason to believe that a vital distinction to make in saying what spatial skills are is that there are two kinds of skill: the between-object representation and transformation skills developed over millennia to support navigation and shared (with variations) by all mobile species, and the within-object representation and transformation skills developed to support making tools developed more recently in evolutionary history and distinctive to our species.

**Are These Two Kinds of Spatial Skill Related?**

Distinguishing between within-object encoding and transformation and between-object encoding and transformation raises an important issue: are abilities in the two sub-domains different enough that calling them both “spatial” becomes confusing? We have already noted that mental rotation and perspective taking seem to be distinct abilities. Even though modest correlations may indicate some relation, there is little indication that the relation is more marked than one would expect given the existence of a general factor in intelligence. Similarly, there are at best modest correlations between psychometric tests of spatial ability, which focus on within-object skills, and learning of large-scale space, which focuses on between-object skills (Hegarty, Montello, Richardson, Lovelace & Ishikawa, 2006; Sholl, 1988). Although future research is needed, at present it seems fair to say that there may be two distinct classes of skill, no more
correlated than any cognitive skills are with each other. They are both “spatial” in a formal sense, because both involve representations and transformations of three-dimensional information, but they are functionally distinct.

**Prior Efforts to Characterize Spatial Skill**

There have, of course, been many prior efforts to categorize and structure spatial abilities. How does our proposal of an important distinction contrasting within-object and between-object encoding and transformation relate to those efforts? Hegarty and Waller (2005) provide a thorough and reflective review of the history of classificatory efforts in the spatial domain, beginning with the factor-analytic tradition, and proceeding through more recent cognitive analyses of tests devised by psychometricians. They reach several conclusions. First, they argue that success on spatial tasks is powerfully influenced by non-spatial factors such as strategies and executive-processing capacity, noting that research on such general or central factors has often proceeded in isolation from research on spatial skill. We agree. The implication is that knowledge of such factors needs to be integrated with research on spatial functioning to create a full understanding. Second, they believe that a bottom-up approach to classification is unlikely to work; there is a need for a theoretical framework that can organize analysis of the organization of spatial functioning. We agree, and put forward the inter- and intra-object distinction as a step in this direction. Third, although the classification efforts they reviewed mainly focused on intra-object encoding and transformation, they also review data on individual differences in navigation abilities and inter-object representations, with the aim of galvanizing attention to assessment in that area and consideration of how skills in it relate to skills of the sort more traditionally assessed by psychometric tests. We could not agree more that assessments of these skills are urgently needed.
Characterizing Navigation

Looking more closely at between-object encoding and transformation, there have been robust efforts to characterize the nature of navigation in the large-scale environment. While this effort has not concerned itself much with individual differences, it has been quite successful in developing a characterization of this domain. There is now widespread agreement that there are two main ways to function in the larger-scale world (Gallistel, 1990; Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000). One method involves encoding of self movements and updating of relations of the self to other objects on the basis of those movements, and has been called *dead reckoning* or *inertial navigation*. (This system is akin to *egocentric responding* in the developmental literature, although egocentrism involves a failure of updating, and akin to *response learning* in the animal cognition literature.) The second system involves encoding of object-to-object relations, with some of these objects being landmarks and organized as a frame of reference. This method has been called *allocentric coding*, or *place learning* in the animal cognition literature, with a more controversial term with added meaning being *cognitive map*. Allocentric coding may involve more than landmarks and frames of reference: Jacobs and Schenk (2003) have drawn attention to the importance of gradients, such as olfactory gradients in water that seem important to aquatic animals, or such as slope of the ground, which can be a powerful cue (Nardi & Bingman, 2009).

Theoretical advances in the analysis of large-scale space have occurred over recent decades due to extensive comparative work, careful cognitive analyses, developmental investigation and neuroscientific research (Doeller, King & Burgess, 2008; Epstein, 2008).

Not everything is settled in terms of how to characterize environmental representations. Controversies remain, including whether there is such a thing as a cognitive map (see Shettleworth, in press, for a cogent comparative analysis), whether there is a separate geometric
module that guides reorientation (see Cheng, 2008, for a recent analysis and proposal of a local-view alternative, and Twyman and Newcombe, in press, for a similar analysis and a review of various alternatives), and most importantly for developmentalists, what the origins of these competencies are. Nevertheless, it is striking that we have excellent theory and typology for large-scale space (and hence for the functions of navigation and object search) and yet lack well-developed assessment instruments and data bases on individual differences in this area.

**Section Summary**

Prior attempts to characterize the nature of spatial skills have been disappointing. We have argued for a typology that distinguishes sharply between inter-object and intra-object representations and processes, on behavioral, linguistic, functional and neurological grounds. What we know about these two kinds of spatial skills is different in each sub-domain. Knowledge about inter-object cognition, used for navigation, has a strong theoretical basis, and much is known about its development. However, research in this area has largely neglected the analysis of individual differences and their development, in part because of a lack of assessment instruments. Knowledge about intra-object spatial cognition, used for tool making, has a much richer tradition of assessment of individual differences. However, there is a marked focus on just one kind of transformation, namely mental rotation, and a relative lack of research of knowledge about other kinds of transformation, such as folding, cross-sectioning, or plastic deformations. One reason for this situation is that there has been less formal theorizing than has been true for navigation about the nature of the overall challenge, e.g., there is no formal typology of the variety of intra-object transformations possible.

**The Nature of Normative Development in Early Spatial Behavior**

Piaget deserves credit for identifying the key questions about spatial development in the
first few years of life, including how infants come to understand what constitutes an object, and how to remember where objects are. In pursuit of the answers, he also identified striking phenomena, including the A not B error, and the egocentric-to-allocentric shift. Research on these questions and phenomena has been intense, and has been augmented by investigation of other phenomena, including the development of place learning, and whether or not there is a “geometric module” that guides reorientation. Along the way, various other theories have come into play to explain spatial development, including versions of nativism, connectionism and dynamic systems theory. The literature on each topic has now grown to the point where a single overview chapter cannot do justice to it all. For expanded discussion of specific issues, see Newcombe and Huttenlocher (2000, 2006) on the A not B error considered from the point of view of what it tells us about spatial development, and on the egocentric-to-allocentric shift; Atkinson and Nardini (2008) on spatial vision and its development, especially in infancy; Learmonth and Newcombe (in press) on place learning in comparative perspective; chapters in Plumert and Spencer (2007) for particular contemporary points of view; and a recent review by Vasilyeva and Lourenco (in press) that gives an overview of many of the issues with an emphasis on an adaptive-combination approach to the development of spatial memory.

Rather than offering an in-depth literature review, the aim of this section is to contrast the core knowledge and the neoconstructivist approaches to spatial development. A recent presentation of the core knowledge perspective proposes four (and maybe five) separable systems of core knowledge (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Two of these systems are directly relevant to spatial development: object representation, and geometric relations in the environment. Strikingly, these systems correspond roughly to our proposed distinction between intra-object and inter-object encoding and transformation—intra-object cognition corresponds roughly to the
proposed core-knowledge systems of object representation and inter-object cognition corresponds roughly to the proposed core-knowledge system of geometric relations in the environment. However, there are also important differences in conceptualization. In particular, the core-knowledge point of view proposes substantially more restricted definitions than those we presented above.

In addition, a third proposed system of core knowledge, the core number system, may be relevant to spatial development. That is because there has been debate regarding whether number understanding is autonomous from spatial thinking from the start, as proposed by Spelke and Kinzler, or is initially related to spatial thinking, with both numerical and spatial systems beginning as forms of an overall quantitative thinking system (Mix, Huttenlocher & Levine, 2002; Newcombe, 2002). Let us examine each of these three issues in turn.

**Object Representations**

Piaget proposed that infants construct their knowledge of objects as connected entities with continuing existence in specifiable spatial locations through visual and manual exploration extending over the first 18 months of life. This picture of development came into question in the 1980s, however, with Kellman and Spelke’s (1983) demonstration that 3- to 4–month-old infants use the Gestalt principle of common fate to group their perceptual world into objects, and with Baillargeon, Spelke and Wasserman’s (1985) demonstration that 5–month-old infants expect that objects continue to exist even when hidden, and that they apparently represent the objects’ solidity and height. Spelke and Kinzler (2007) review evidence indicating the existence of a core system of object representation that centers on cohesion (i.e., objects move together as wholes), continuity (i.e., objects move on connected paths without obstructions) and contact (i.e., objects do not interact at a distance). In addition, they point to evidence that the proposed system has a
signature limit of four objects, is present at birth and continues through life, and is shared with non-human primates.

**Questions about a core system of object representations.** There are several reasons to be cautious about a strongly nativist interpretation of demonstrations of very early infant competence in this domain. Early qualms were voiced by Haith (1998), but considerable further evidence has accumulated since that time. First, Scott Johnson’s programmatic research has shown that visual learning can explain the development of the principles of object cohesion and continuity over the first few months of life (Johnson, 2009a). An infant with normal vision and known learning mechanisms, living in an expectable world in which solid objects obey physical laws, will be guaranteed to develop these principles through experience. Second, Amy Needham has conducted a series of studies showing that infants’ manual exploration of objects is vital in their learning about the nature of objects, including where objects are demarcated (Needham, 2009). An infant with normally-developing manual skills and known learning mechanisms will be guaranteed to further develop object principles constructed in the first few months by vision alone. Third, Rachel Keen has shown that toddlers do not apply principles of continuity and solidity in an action task, raising questions about the nature of the representations that support findings with infants using looking-time methodology (Keen, 2003). Keen’s findings are consistent with the notion of graded representations used in connectionist models of the development of understanding of objects (Munakata, McClelland, Johnson & Siegler, 1997). Overall, what emerges from these three lines of research is support for the idea that a system of object representation is constructed in the first year of life by visual and manual exploration.

This way of thinking is broadly consistent with constructivism, although it is different in many important ways from Piaget’s original thinking. It posits stronger starting points (far from
a blank slate, not at all traditional empiricism or even traditional constructivism), and much faster progress than Piaget thought he saw. In addition, contemporary research methods allow us to conduct a more careful analysis of mechanisms of development than Piaget was able to do, augmented with computational models. In short, this way of thinking is neoconstructivism.

Neoconstructivist thinking is further supported by a line of research growing from Xu and Carey’s (1996) finding that infants rely exclusively on spatiotemporal principles in determining the presence and number of objects in the world. Babies less than 12 months in their studies seemed to believe that there were two objects rather than one object behind a screen when each of two perceptually and conceptually distinct objects appeared in regular oscillation (see also Newcombe, Huttenlocher & Learmonth, 1999; Xu, Carey & Quint, 2004). Fundamental changes in how babies compute the number of objects present in a scene fit poorly with a core knowledge position.

The Xu and Carey findings do, however, pose the puzzle of how to reconcile them with data showing that perceptual information does serve to differentiate objects from each other for much younger infants (Needham & Baillargeon, 2000). One possibility is that the Xu-Carey paradigm is simply too challenging to allow younger infants to demonstrate their true competence, and there is support for this position (Wilcox & Baillargeon, 1998; see also Krojgaard, 2007; Xu & Baker, 2005). Subsequent research has also shown that very salient featural information can serve to differentiate and enumerate objects in infants younger than 12 months (e.g., in a comparison of a human-like object to a non-human one; Bonatti, Frot, Zangler & Mehler, 2002). Nevertheless, spatiotemporal information usually is dominant (Krojgaard, 2007; Xu & Baker, 2005).

Most important in resolving this puzzle has been Teresa Wilcox’s careful program of
research on infants’ use of various perceptual characteristics of objects, including color, pattern, luminance and auditory characteristics. Wilcox has shown that there are varying ages at which infants can use each attribute to delineate objects in varying circumstances. Most intriguingly, she has shown the effect of experience on the use and weighting of these various characteristics (Wilcox & Woods, 2009). Thus, overall, the evidence suggests that the factors that delineate objects are constructed by infants in the course of interaction with an expectable world, in accord with principles of an adaptive combination approach (and, possibly, a Bayesian approach although the quantitative evaluation necessary to establish Bayesianism has not yet been conducted).

**Mental rotation.** The core-knowledge approach concentrates on the definition of objects rather than on the coding of their internal structure and the transformation of that coding in operations such as rotation or folding. In this regard, the core knowledge approach differs substantially from our proposed typology by ignoring an account of functionally important characteristics of objects. Piaget had of course dealt with mental rotation, although interestingly not in the same works in which he addressed spatial development but rather in his book on mental imagery. He had suggested that mental rotation was not possible until the age of 7 to 8 years (Piaget & Inhelder, 1966/1971). However, research by Marmor (1975, 1977) suggested a much earlier onset of mental rotation, at the age of 4 to 5 years. There was some controversy about this conclusion (reviewed in Newcombe 2002a) but Marmor’s conclusion has been widely accepted. In fact, other studies have shown some evidence of mental rotation in experiments using looking time by infants as young as 4 months (Hespos & Rochat, 1997; Rochat & Hespos, 1996), although there may be early sex differences, with male infants showing more evidence of mental rotation than female infants (Moore & Johnson, 2008; Quinn & Liben, 2008).
Despite this interesting evidence, however, the prevailing acceptance of very early mental rotation needs to be interpreted with caution. As with the object identification work already discussed, experience in viewing moving objects in the first months of life may be relevant to the demonstrated abilities, manual experience with turning objects may be relevant to continued development, and looking time measures may not translate into the ability to act in the real world. Mental rotation is far from fully developed in infancy. Ornkloo and von Hofsten (2007) found that it was not until 22 months that infants could mentally rotate objects to be fitted through an aperture in order to successfully fit objects through holes. Frick and Wang (2009) have shown that infants of 16 but not 14 months look longer at unexpected outcomes of mental rotation, although 14-month-olds’ improved after hands-on experience with a turntable. In addition, mental rotation continues to strengthen through early childhood (Estes, 1998; Levine, Huttenlocher, Taylor & Langrock, 1999; Okamoto-Barth & Call, 2008), and motor representations may be especially important for young children (Frick, Daum, Walser & Mast, 2009; Frick, Daum, Wilson & Wilkening, 2009; Funk, Brugger & Wilkening, 2005). Mental rotation undergoes considerable development, is accelerated by motor experience, and shows important individual differences. These three facts suggest that a core knowledge of objects, even if it exists, does not provide a complete account of spatial functioning.

Environmental Representations

Just as Piaget thought that infants did not possess the concept of an object, he also thought they had no way to represent spatial location except in relation to the self and as at the disposal of their own actions. He argued that early spatial understanding was topological, and transitioned to projective and Euclidean representations only at the age of 9 or 10 years. However, various lines of subsequent research undermined these age norms, as well as
questioning Piaget’s proposed typology of spatial representation. For example, the literature on perspective taking ultimately showed that egocentrism is overcome early in the preschool years (see review by Newcombe, 1989), and that even exact perspective-taking computations can be produced by children as young as 3 years, given appropriate testing (Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 1992). In addition, an egocentric-to-allocentric shift, although consistent with Piaget’s formulations in a general way, occurred at younger ages and in a fashion that showed considerable variability as a function of stimuli and testing conditions—in certain conditions, babies less than a year old showed allocentric responding (Acredolo, 1990). The outcome of this activity was generally to undermine faith in Piaget’s formulations, although it was often forgotten that, despite strong starting points and early transitions, development in spatial memory does continue through the age of 9 years or so that Piaget proposed (e.g., Sandberg, Huttenlocher & Newcombe, 1996).

**Core knowledge about geometry?** Nativist approaches to environmental knowledge were relatively uncommon during the 1980s, except for Landau, Spelke and Gleitman’s (1984) claim that a blind child was able to construct Euclidean relations at ages between 2 and 4 years. This claim, however, turned out to fit poorly with the overall literature on spatial representations in the blind (Thinus-Blanc & Gaunet, 1997). The nativist approach really took on environmental knowledge in a fulsome way in its suggestion of a geometric module (beginning with Hermer & Spelke, 1994). In Spelke and Kinzler’s (2007) version of a nativist approach to cognitive development, they propose that there is a core system that serves to represent “places in the spatial layout and their geometric relationships” (p. 89).

There are numerous problems with this proposal, recently reviewed by Twyman and Newcombe (in press), who organized their critique into five reasons for doubting the geometric
module (summarized in Table 1). What approach can successfully explain all the relevant phenomena is not yet clear, but there is now an extensive knowledge base that any theory would need to encompass (summarized in Table 2).

Perhaps the most important problem, however, with the idea of a core knowledge system for representing the spatial layout is that it is a massively incomplete account of navigation. A focus on what organisms do to recover the spatial layout once they have been disoriented ignores an essential aspect of spatial functioning and its development, namely, the inertial navigation system. This system exhibits marked age-related change (Rieser & Pick, 2007) and Bayesian processes (Cheng et al., 2007). While in one sense disorientation is merely a methodological issue (i.e., if an experimenter does not perform disorientation, participants are able to use their body-centered coding to recover at least a rough sense of where they are), ignoring body-centered coding can only provide a very partial view of normal navigation. In addition, we know little about development or the use of geometric information in individuals who are not disoriented; initial evidence suggests it may have an important but as yet largely-unanalyzed role in normal spatial memory (Kelly, McNamara, Bodenheimer, Rieser & Carr, 2008).

**Beyond core knowledge of geometry to an adaptive combination approach.** As just argued, a central problem with a core knowledge approach to environmental representations is that it simply ignores most of the relevant data and phenomena in the area. There is much more to navigation than reorientation, including inertial navigation as just mentioned, and the use of symbolic representations, as discussed in the next major section. In addition, there is a wealth of information on topics such as the use of strategies in navigation (see Newcombe & Huttenlocher, 2000 for review); the use of categories in spatial memory (see Huttenlocher & Lourenco, 2007, and Plumert, Hund & Recker, 2007, for review); and dynamic change in spatial location memory...
(Spencer, Smith & Thelen, 2001; Spencer & Hund, 2002). One of the clearest ways to see how much the core-knowledge perspective omits is to examine recent papers by Marko Nardini and his collaborators (Bullens, Nardini, Doeller, Braddick, Postma & Burgess, in press; Nardini, Burgess, Breckenridge & Atkinson, 2006; Nardini, Jones, Bedford & Braddick, 2008; Nardini, Thomas, Knowland, Braddick & Atkinson, 2009). In these papers, there are important demonstrations of how use of various frames of reference changes with age. For example, Nardini et al. (2008) found that children as old as 8 years fail to combine allocentric and egocentric sources of information about spatial location, alternating between the two of them in conflict situations. By contrast, adults showed evidence that they integrated cues in a Bayesian fashion, weighting them close to optimally to reduce variance. Research along these lines has high promise for leveraging our knowledge about human development across domains (Xu, 2008; Xu & Tenenbaum, 2007) and across species (Waisman & Jacobs, 2008).

**Space and Number**

The core-knowledge approach to number distinguishes representations of number sharply from other quantitative representations, such as representations of spatial extent, as well as of other continuous properties such as time. Spelke and Kinzler (2007) argue that the core number system is characterized by three central properties: imprecision that grows linearly with increasing values; abstract generalization across sensory modalities; and the ability to be compared and combined by addition and subtraction. Each of these ideas is somewhat controversial within the literature on number. For example, there has been debate regarding whether and how to make a sharp distinction between small and large numbers and what the nature of a distinction is (e.g., Cordes & Brannon, 2009; Feigenson, Dehaene & Spelke, 2004). What is more important in the present context, however, is whether or not number
representations (or, at least, large-number representations) can be clearly separated from representations of other continuous quantities, especially early in development. Theorists have proposed that number, space and time are closely linked (e.g., Walsh, 2003). Recent evidence suggests considerable overlap of these systems, ranging from the behavioral level in infants (Lourenco & Longo, in press) to the neural level in adults (Knops, Thirion, Hubbard, Michel & Dehaene, 2009). If true, the developmental challenge is to separate these systems (i.e., differentiation) rather than to link them.

Section Summary

Object representations develop over the first year of life, as infants explore the world visually and manually and gather evidence about it. The ability to imagine transformations of objects also develops, over an age range extending through the toddler and preschool years. Similarly, representations of the environment change in many ways over the first decade of life. An emerging perspective emphasizes the value of detailed analysis of how children learn which cues to rely on and how to weight these cues optimally. Another challenge for the future is further delineation of how the spatial and numerical systems are intertwined and differentiated.

Spatial Symbols and Spatial Development

Symbolic representations play an extremely important role in the development of spatial cognition. Perhaps the most distinguishing characteristic of human spatial cognition is that the representations and basic processes that we discussed in the prior sections are augmented through the use of symbolic representations such as spatial language, maps, models, graphs, and spatial gesture. Indeed, much of the development of spatial cognition that occurs past the preschool years is due largely to interaction with symbolic systems.
Symbolic representations of space expand what people know about spatial information and how we know it in two overlapping ways. The first is in terms of the **amount or quantity** of information that we can acquire. Human navigation and spatial knowledge is greatly augmented by symbolically mediated communication. Much of what we know about different spaces is *not* acquired from direct experience. For example, consider what you know about the locations of cities around the world, the borders of nations, the spatial relations between continents, etc. People must rely on the information that others can provide, either directly through conversation, pointing, etc, or indirectly, through maps, written directions that can be shared, etc. Each of these forms of spatial communication inherently involves symbolic representation.

The second influence of symbols is in terms of the **kind or quality** of information that symbolic representations can provide. As we will argue below, symbol systems can make available information that would be difficult or impossible to acquire from direct expense, even if one had the time and money to travel extensively. For example, it can be difficult to acquire a view of a large-scale space from a top-down view, but maps make this sort of information perceptible and therefore cognitively tractable. Likewise, the language that we use to describe spatial relations may influence what sorts of information easily comes to mind; different forms of linguistic influence may help to bring to mind alternate ways of conceptualizing spatial information. Thus symbol systems affect not only how much we know but how we know it. In much of what follows we discuss how, when, and why the use of spatial symbols can help us to transcend the limits of our own direct experience.

We consider three spatial symbol systems: language, maps and models, and gesture. Although these three systems seem different on the surface, each can be used to convey two important types of spatial information: the structure of the space and the experience of moving
through the space (e.g., giving directions). In each section, we begin by discussing the characteristics and affordances of the symbol system as it relates to the communication of spatial information. We then provide a brief overview of research on the development of the ability to understand and use the particular symbol system to acquire and to communicate spatial information.

**Language**

Language is obviously the most frequently used symbol system. But in contrast to maps, it is not inherently linked to spatial cognition, although it obviously can be used to describe spatial relations. In this section we consider both the advantages and limitations of using space to describe both simple spatial relations as well as more complex relations involving multiple locations.

**Language and object representation.** There is evidence that language may affect the development of children’s perception and conception of individual objects. Smith (2009) noted that between 18- and 24-months of age, children develop the ability to recognize geometric outlines, such as the outline of the horse shown in Figure 1 below. Before this age, children can recognize pictures of specific horses as horses, but they cannot generalize based on the shape of the generalized, geometric shape.

The development of the perceptual recognition of geometric shapes may be influenced by, or at least related, to language development. Smith documented a strong correlation between children’s knowledge of nouns and their recognition of geometric outlines of the referents of the nouns. For example, visual recognition of the geometric outline of a horse is correlated with knowing the word “horse”. Learning the label may help children to transcend perceptual organization that is based on individual parts to one that also includes geometric shape. Of
course, the direction of causality here remains an issue of controversy: do children learn the labels or the shapes first? But in any case, these results demonstrate the possibility of linguistic influences on spatial perception at a young age.

Figure 1: Geometric Representation of a Horse. From Smith (2009).

**Language and spatial relations.** One of the most exciting areas of research in cognition in the past 10 to 15 years involves work on the relation between spatial language and spatial thought. This issue has been at the focus of work on the relation between language and thought. Much of this debate has centered on whether, or what extend, different linguistic expressions of space influence how we think about spatial information. Some researchers, such as Levinson (1996, 2003) have argued that different types of linguistic reference frames may influence what sorts of information people take into account when thinking about spatial location. For example, there are languages that rely on allocentric or geocentric reference frames to describe even simple spatial relations. Although there are many forms of allocentric reference, the common characteristic is that spatial locations are coded in terms of the surrounding environment. A common example would be to code locations in terms of cardinal directions (i.e., North, South, East, and West). In contrast, egocentric reference frames code locations relative to the body. A common example is left and right. Note that confusions such “my left” and “your left” can arise only in an egocentric system because each speaker habitually codes locations relevant to his or her body.
Levinson and colleagues have demonstrated cross-linguistic differences in the use of allocentric and egocentric reference frames. Western languages such as English, Dutch, German, Spanish emphasize egocentric frameworks. Other languages, such as Tzetahl and Yuir Gu, emphasize Large differences in memory, search, and communication have been found that are strongly correlated with the typical spatial frame of reference that one’s language uses. Taken together, this line of research provides what some think is strong evidence of the influences of language on thought, and particularly spatial thought.

However, other researchers (e.g., Li & Gleitman, 2002) have strongly challenged the claim that this line of work provides evidence for strong effects of language and spatial thinking. Li and Gleitman argued that the effects of frames of reference are malleable and that language does not create or even alter a preference for a given frame of reference. Thus they reject the notion that recent work on the relation between spatial language and spatial thought is an example of a Whorfian effect—a direct and causal relation between how concepts are represented in language and how people think about these concepts.

One possible intermediate position is that spatial language can direct attention toward particular types of spatial relations, without completely constraining the possibility of representing alternative spatial relations. In developmental work with 18-month-old infants, Casasola, Bhagwat and Burke (2009) provide a nice example of how language can direct the acquisition of spatial concepts. They showed that brief experience with a linguistic label for “tight fit” can aid infants in forming an abstract categorical representation of this relation.

**Comparative and developmental perspectives on the relation between language and thought.** Until recently, most work on alternate spatial reference frames has focused on demonstrating their existence and investigating a variety of reference frames in different
languages. Researchers now have begun to study these issues from comparative and developmental perspectives, and these studies shed substantial additional light on the mechanisms through language might influence spatial thinking. Examples of these studies highlight the importance of symbolic influences on spatial cognition and the role of symbolic influences both in human evolution and development,

Haun et al. (2005) investigated the evolutionary origins of geocentric and egocentric reference frames by adapting Levinson et al.'s tasks to include non-human apes as participants. Two orangutans and five gorillas were trained to search for food that was hidden under one of three containers, as shown in Figure 2. With successive search, a strong bias to search at a particular cup was induced. Then the ape was moved to the opposite side of the array. The question was whether the apes would continue to search at the same absolute location (and hence continue to find the hidden food despite being moved). The answer was yes; the apes chose the allocentrically-correct cup significantly more often than chance and chose the egocentrically-correct cup significantly less often than chance. In combination with cross-linguistic comparisons in humans, these results suggest that humans share with our evolutionary cousins an ability to code locations allocentrically. The preference for egocentric coding that seems so natural to speakers of Western languages may be the result of what Haun et al. called “cultural override” of our evolved preference for allocentric coding. Egocentric coding requires exposure to these terms in language; allocentric coding does not and hence is available both to apes and humans.
Further evidence for the evolutionary or developmental primacy of allocentric coding comes from the work of Shusterman and Li (2009). These researchers examined specifically how and when children map spatial words to spatial frames of reference, as well as children’s default assumptions as to what spatial terms might mean. Four-year-olds were taught nonsense syllables that could mean, in essence, right or left, or north and south. For example, different toys were placed at opposite ends of the room, and the children were taught that one toy was on their “Ziv” side and the another toy was on their “Kern” side. Then, the children were turned 180 degrees, new toys were placed in the room, and the children were asked to indicate which of the new toys was on the Ziv or Kern side. This manipulation can reveal how the children interpreted the nonsense words. If they took Ziv or Kern to mean north and south, then the interpretation will not be affected by the rotation, as north and south remain the same despite rotation. If, however, the children took Ziv and Kern to mean right and left, then they will point to the opposite side of the space after they are rotated.

By default, children adopted the absolute frame of reference, interpreting Ziv and Kern as meaning North and South. Thus, absolute reference frames seem to be default assumption in young children, a finding that is consistent with Haun et al.'s work with apes. Given that allocentric coding seems to be the evolutionary and developmental default, the reliance of many
common languages on egocentric coding is evidence of the potentially strong influence of
glanguage on spatial cognition and communication.

**Describing spatial relations.** One potential limitation of research on the relation between
spatial thought and spatial language is that almost all of the studies of linguistic frames of
reference have focused on the description or memory of a very limited number of spatial
relations. These studies have not addressed the development of the ability to communicate
multiple locations through space, or to acquire information about multiple relations from
language. In the next section we look at both the disadvantages and advantages of using language
to describe more complex spatial scenes.

Describing spatial relations in words, or acquiring information about spatial relations from
words, can present substantial challenges. One property of language that may pose a problem is
linearity: words are given one at a time in a sequence, in accordance with the grammar of the
language. Thus only one spatial relation can be described at a time (see Newcombe &
Huttenlocher, 2000). Consequently, communicating multiple locations can easily become
cumbersome to the speaker and can place substantial memory demands on the listener (Brunye,
Rapp & Taylor, 2008).

One potential way of examining the communication of information about more complex
spaces involves giving directions, or describing an object or scene for another person. Plumert
and colleagues (e.g., Craton et al., 1990; Plumert, Ewert, & Spear, 1995, Plumert, et al. 1994)
investigated the development of children's comprehension of spatial descriptions. Three- and
four-year-olds were asked to describe the locations of objects within a dollhouse. Even the three
year-olds were able to describe locations in terms of a single landmark and a simple spatial
relation (e.g., “the bear on the table” or “the bear next to the table”). However, only the 4-year-
olds were able to use two relations to disambiguate a location. Along similar lines, Hund and Plumert (2007) and Hund and Naroleski (2008) examined how 3- and 4-year-old children (and adults) used “by” to describe proximity to a landmark, and found increases in systematicity of usage.

Although spatial relations in language can only be presented serially, it is possible to form a map-like mental representation from listening to a description. However, this process may require that people integrate the information: infer spatial relations that are not described to fill in relations. Uttal, Fisher, and Taylor (2006) investigated the development of the process of spatial integration. They asked 6-year-olds, 8-year-old, and adults first to memorize a set of serial descriptions of a space that consisted of six rooms arranged in two row of three. Although almost all of the children could learn the descriptions, very few of the 8-year-olds integrated the descriptions into the correct layout. When asked to construct a model of the space, based solely on the descriptions that they had heard, most 8-year-olds simply replicated the serial ordering of the relations as they occurred in the descriptions. Ondracek and Allen (2000) reached similar conclusions: even though children showed accurate memory for the descriptions, they failed to integrate these descriptions into a coherent mental model or representation of the described space.

**Summary.** The relation between thought and language has re-emerged as topic of great interest in cognitive science. Spatial cognition has proved to be a particularly fruitful domain in which to study this general topic. These studies clearly show the importance of symbols in spatial reasoning. Yet, at the same time, most of the studies do not capture one of the most important characteristics of spatial representation, which is the communication of multiple spatial relations. As we argued in this section, the communication of multiple spatial relations
differs fundamentally from the communication of only one or two spatial relations. Thus despite
the proliferation of studies on spatial thought and spatial language, we still know very little about
the development of the ability to communicate different kinds of spatial information through
language. This topic could be a fruitful area for future research.

Maps

Maps are the prototypical way to creating a visualization of an environment. They are
largely image-driven representations of space. Although maps often use words as labels and
keys, most of the information is presented in a very spatial, imagistic way. What does it mean to
mainly represent a space using images? Images are not constrained by linearity, allowing them to
show many locations and relations simultaneously. They may also provide a more stable
perspective of the space (often from an overhead view). Both of these factors may make them
better candidates for conveying route information and complex layouts.

In contrast to language, maps allow us to convey multiple elements simultaneously.
They can show all that we need to know in order to solve a task. As a result, communicating
using mainly images may require less inference-making and problem-solving than the same
information represented using words (Larkin & Simon, 1987).

Images may also convey the overhead, or survey, perspective better than speech. This view
can be useful for understanding the layout of a space, as well as the relations among the locations
contained therein (Blaut, 1991; Uttal, 2000). This perspective can be important because we
commonly do not have the chance to see the space in this way during navigation. From our
perspective on the ground, we usually cannot see all the locations we would like to visit or
describe. The distance between locations may be too great and our view may be obscured. In
order to comprehend our environment, we may consolidate our views of different locations and
infer where they are in relation to one another. Although people can use the survey perspective when communicating the space with words, they do not often use it consistently (Taylor & Tversky, 1996). The survey perspective is often mixed with the route perspective (i.e., the perspective of someone walking through the space) and the gaze perspective (i.e., the perspective of someone viewing the space from a fixed location). Although these views may provide additional information about the experience of being in the space, they may not convey relational information as effectively as the survey view. Additionally, there may be consequences for memory when learning the space through only the route perspective. With limited exposure (i.e., reading through once), route descriptions lead to perspective-specific memory and require more study time. Even with repeated exposure, reading time data suggests that route directions are difficult to process. They may be more difficult to integrate into our spatial mental models of a space than the survey view, demanding more complex mental imagery and additional inferences (Brunye, Rapp & Taylor, 2008; Noordzij & Postma, 2004; Lee & Tversky, 2005).

**Developing understanding of maps and models.** There has been extensive research on the development of children's understanding of the symbolic relation between maps, photographs, and scale models and the spaces that they represent. Indeed, research of this type has proved to be particularly relevant for studying the development of symbolic thought. In a typical task (e.g., DeLoache, 1987, Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005) a child is asked to find a hidden toy, using the map or model as a guide. The child is shown, for example, where a miniature toy is hiding in the scale model and then is asked to find the corresponding, larger toy in the room that the model represents. Regardless of whether the child succeeds in finding the toy in the room, he or she is brought back to the model and asked to retrieve the miniature toy. Finding the miniature toy proves that any problems in finding the toy in the room could not be
due to forgetting where it was located. Therefore, if children fail, it is because they have not understood the relation between the model and the room. Children of 3.0-years succeed in the typical task, but children only six months younger typically fail (although some more recent studies have found that 2.5-year-olds can succeed in some situations). However, 2.5-year-olds can succeed when using a photograph instead of the scale model, but 2.0-year-olds cannot.

This line of work has been invaluable in understanding the course of the development of symbolic understanding. However, some researchers (e.g., Blades & Cooke, 1994) have argued that success in the standard DeLoache task does not require that the child map the spatial relations between what is found in the model and what is found in the room. In the typical DeLoache task, each of the possible hiding locations is unique; there is one chair, one couch, one floor pillow, etc. Therefore, the child never has to discriminate locations on the basis of the spatial location of the objects in the model or the room. For example, the child does not need to remember whether the floor pillow is to the right or left of the couch.

In fact, children less than four do have difficulty mapping locations on the basis of spatial relations. For example, Blades and Cooke (1994) included both unique and identical items in a mapping task. When the toy was hidden behind one of the identical objects, the children needed to rely on spatial locations to distinguish between the two. Children less than 4 years could reliably map on the basis of object identity but not on the basis of object identity. For example, if the model included two identical chairs and two other unique objects, the children could not distinguish between the two chairs. Loewenstein and Gentner (2005) showed that mapping on the basis of spatial relations could be enhanced if these relations were embedded within a spatially-based language framework. For example, labeling hidden locations as "top, middle, and bottom" substantially improved children's performance. Loewenstein and Gentner suggested
that the improvement stemmed from the labels that communicated an organized spatial structure. The children could then use that structure to encode and map the spatial relations between the two models. These results simultaneously confirm the challenges of mapping spatial relations and the possibility of overcoming these challenges. Chen (2007) suggested that noticing the potential analogy between two spaces was part of the challenge for preschoolers, along with initially encoding locations in each space separately, and, once the analogy was noticed, detecting precise correspondences.

There is also work on preschool children’s use of maps to guide way finding, which indicates that they show some ability to use maps in simple situations (e.g., Vosmik & Presson, 2004). In addition, the ability to appreciate scaling relation is present in a rudimentary form in 3-year-old children, but shows development over the next several years (Huttenlocher, Newcombe & Vasilyeva, 1999; Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, Newcombe & Duffy, 2008; Vasilyeva & Huttenlocher, 2004).

**Beyond the preschool years.** The world is not limited to scale models and rooms. Children need to understand maps that represent larger, geographic-scale areas and that they develop an appreciation of the various symbols that are used to convey different kinds of information on maps. Acquiring this sort of information often begins late in the preschool years, but the developmental process last several years. Research on the development of children's understanding and use of maps past the preschool years reveals the importance of studying development beyond the typical young ages that have become the focus of most current developmental research.

Liben and colleagues (e.g., Liben & Downs, 1993; Liben, Kastens, & Stevenson, 2002) have documented a series of developments that occurs in children's processing of geographic-
scale maps. Interesting, many of these developments parallel those observed in younger children using smaller-scale maps or scale models. At first, children often seem not to fully grasp that the maps is intended to be a representation of a space. For example, when children are asked to identify features on a map, they sometimes name features that violate the scale of the map. For example, when examining a map of Chicago, one child correctly identified Lake Michigan but then claimed to be able to see fishes in lake—a perception that would not be possible at the scale at which the map was drawn.

These findings should not be interpreted in a dichotomous fashion, as whether children "can" or "cannot" read maps (see Liben & Downs, 1997). Even three-year-olds can identify some features on maps, but their identification seems to be limited to situations in which there is a high degree of similarity between the represented item on the map and the intended referent. For example, children often succeed when identifying water on maps, presumably because the water is colored blue, both on the map and in the space that the map represents. But children have much more difficulty when they are asked to identify or understand correspondences that are not based solely on physical similarity. In fact, physical similarity seems to get in the way, or children have a strong belief that there should be a degree of physical similarity between the map and what it represents. For example, one child claimed that a red line on a map could not represent a road (when in fact it did represent a major highway) because there are no red roads on the map. Similarly, another child claimed that a line on a map could not represent a road because it was too small to accommodate a car.

These and other examples clearly show that the development of an understanding both of the representational nature of maps and the spatial correspondences between maps and their referents is not an easy or all-or-none process. Like many other forms of development, it
probably develops in fits and starts (e.g., Opfer & Siegler, 2007). Knowledge of the representational components of maps likely can co-exist or even compete with interpretations that are based on the physical properties of the referent. Children can demonstrate their nascent knowledge of the representational relation between a map and a geographic-scale space under certain conditions—high similarity, familiarity with the space that the map represents, etc. But even in the same testing session, children can be affected by the physical properties of the representation itself. Part of development of map-reading skill, like many other developments, may involve learning to coordinate these alternate construals, to focus on one and suppress the other, etc. Executive control plays an important role in map reading, as it does in many other forms of cognitive development (e.g. Zelazo, 2004).

**Cognitive consequences of map use.** It seems possible that over time, the use of maps may contribute to spatial thinking. Maps bring into view a perspective on the world that differs fundamentally from the perspective from which we typically navigate. Using this perspective may have cognitive consequences, by making children (and adults) aware of the possibility of thinking about spaces in ways that transcend how they normally navigate through them. Maps may be a cognitive tool or scaffold that help people to overcome and hence to think about the limitations of their own perception.

Although researchers often refer to mental representations as "cognitive maps", as mentioned earlier, the psychological or neural existence of true cognitive maps remains a topic of great debate. Previously, we have argued that learning about maps might bring into conscious awareness information about relations that have not been experienced directly. For example, although we might have great difficulty inferring relations that we have not experienced directly, we might easily gain this information from looking at a map. The use of maps might bring into
awareness the possibility of thinking about spatial relations that we have not experienced directly before.

Evidence to support this claim comes from a variety of sources. Some studies, for example, have shown that exposing children to a map can help them both to represent and to communicate spatial relations among locations. Showing 4- to 6-year-olds maps can facilitate inference-making and the process of spatial integration (Uttal & Wellman, 1989; Uttal, Fisher, & Taylor, 2006). In addition, learning about maps can help children make inferences about the relations between locations in their neighborhood, even when the children have not experienced these relations directly (Davies & Uttal, 2007).

**Gesture**

Gesturing involves the movement of hands across space. Like the images in maps, gestures can represent different objects or locations and can indicate direction. These elements make gesture seem like it uses images to communicate information. However, unlike maps, gestures are constrained to representing only two elements simultaneously. This constraint is a consequence of having only two hands (sometimes less, if we are carrying something or are injured). If we represent more than two locations or objects at a time, this information would be tied to a sequence. Additionally, gesture often requires speech in order to be understood.

Gestures can visually convey information. McNeil (1992) described speech and gesture as an “idea unit,” with the gestures conveying imagery. Among other things, gestures can represent objects or locations (Cassell & McNeill, 1991; Emmorey, Tversky, & Taylor, 2000) indicate direction (Allen, 2003), indicate relative size or position (Beattie & Shovelton, 1999), and show motion (Feyereisen and Havard, 1999; Ehrlich, Levine, and Goldin-Meadow, 2006).
The ability of gesture to convey visual information makes it a good candidate for depicting spatial information during discourse.

Like speech and maps, gestures can convey information about spatial layouts and the experience of moving through space. However, gestures can look a lot like maps. In figure 3, a person describes information about Chicago’s museums as he would describe it to a tourist. The right panel shows a map of the same museum area. To describe the relations among the museums, he uses one hand to represent the Art Institute of Chicago and the other to represent the Field Museum. The placement of his two hands is roughly parallel to the relation between the two symbols on the map.

A person describes the relation between the Art Institute (his left hand) and the Field Museum (his right hand) from the point of view of facing the Art Institute (Eastward). The right panel shows a map illustrating the relation between the two museums.

In figures 4a - c, he describes how a tourist could travel between the two museums by tracing a path and indicating the location of the underpass that would help the tourist avoid crossing Lakeshore Drive. Although this underpass is not indicated on the map in figure 3, this
information could be shown in a sketch map (figure 4d). The sketch map also depicts the route and shows an area indicating the underpass.

Although gestures can capture some of the elements of maps, they have two major differences: gestures are more fleeting than maps and gestures can be tied to a sequence. Gestures are visible but they are temporary; in order to comprehend multiple gestures, a listener must watch the sequence and combine the individual units. These features are more closely
aligned to speech. Words are fleeting because they leave no tangible trace behind (although they can make a lasting impression) and are sequential because of the linear nature of language.

Additionally, gesture often occurs during speech. Gestures often need context in order for their meaning to be resolved. Goldin-Meadow (2005) gives the example of a gesture that could be interpreted differently under two contexts: consider a rotating gesture made with a pointing hand. The gesture refers to a ballerina’s movements when the speaker says, “She does lovely pirouettes.” However, the same gesture refers to a hand twisting off a jar lid when the speaker says, “Which direction shall I turn this?” (p. 7)

Speech and gesture form a mutually-beneficial partnership in which speech can resolve gesture’s meaning and gesture can augment speech. Gestures can resolve the perspective-switching issue by revealing which perspective the speaker is currently using (Kita, Danziger, & Stolz, 2001). In some spatial communication, gesture actually accounts for a sizable proportion of information. Bergman and Kopp (2006) analyzed the distribution of information across speech and gesture for students giving directions. Participants communicated over half of the spatial information (51.38%) using only their gestures. In other words, if an interlocutor could not see the speaker’s hands, they would only be receiving about half of the information communicated.

In summary, gesture lies toward the middle of the image-language continuum. Gesture is able to communicate spatial information in a visual manner, similarly to maps. However, these images are fleeting and often sequential. Although gesture can add to speech, gesture also needs speech in order to be resolved. Gesture is a form of imagery that is intimately tied to speech.

**Research on the development of gesture use.** Despite the potential importance of gesture in spatial cognition (e.g., Alibali, 2005), it has received far less attention than language or maps have. Most of the studies have been done have focused on the use of gesture to
communicate route information. For example, Allen (2003) and Iverson (1999) showed that young children’s spatial gestures often indicate the route that was followed or should be followed, rather than the spatial relations among locations along the route.

More recently, Sauter et al. (under review) have investigated the development of children's use of gesture to communicate spatial information, particularly the relative position of locations. The participants (8- and 10-year-olds and adults) first learned the layout of a space by navigating through it several times. They were then asked to communicate the locations of the animals to their mother or father.

Adults tended to use both speech and gesture when describing the locations. They often began by providing an overall description, usually in speech, of the overall layout of the space. The most common way this was done was by describing the space in matrix language terms, such as by saying, "it was a 3 x 2". They often augmented their descriptions with gestures. For example, they often placed one hand down and depicted progress through the speech relative to this fixed hand. Then they would provide the identity of the animal at each location. Thus speech and gesture interacted in a reciprocal or redundant way; the spatial descriptions seamlessly combined speech and gesture, and the adults used the affordances of each form of symbolic representation to communicate aspects of the elements of the locations.

In contrast, 8-year-olds provided very little, if any, information about the relation among the locations, either in speech or gesture. Their descriptions tended to focus on the route they had followed when first learning the locations. They seldom gestured. However, a follow-up study showed that the children could gesture if encouraged to do so. The instructions were simply, "You can use your hands to show where the animals live." Eight of the 11 participants responded favorably to these instructions, gesturing frequently. Perhaps more importantly, the
appearance of their gestures often resembled those of the adult. Thus, 8-year-olds can use gesture to communicate spatial layout, but they do not do so spontaneously.

**Summary**

Human spatial cognition shares both important similarities and differences with spatial cognition in other species. All species face the basic challenges of representing objects and the relations between objects. Likewise, all mobile species must be able to find their way back to their home, be it burrow, den, or a townhouse. Thus, in one sense, the search for cross-species similarities has been quite successful.

But there is also one very important difference between human and non-human species. In humans, however, symbolic communication greatly enhances what we know about space and how we know it. For example, our language can influence which spatial frames of reference we use habitually. Likewise, maps and gesture can augment substantially the kinds of information that we can perceive. Thus, to a large extent, the development of spatial cognition beyond the first few years of life is largely about the influences of symbols on spatial thought and communication.

**How to Use What We Know**

Spatial thinking is the orphan of the academic curriculum. It is not the focus of intense early instruction, as are reading, writing and arithmetic. Nor is it generally considered a highly-valued intellectual skill to be tested in high-stakes assessment situations, or given a grade. Yet the research we reviewed early in the chapter suggests that spatial thinking influences interest and academic success in the STEM disciplines. How best can we use what we know about spatial development to augment STEM learning, as well as everyday success in spatial tasks? The answer is not likely to be establishing Space as the next letter after the three R’s. Rather,
spatially-infused curriculum can foster the required suite of skills (National Research Council, 2006). Such a curriculum can benefit from what we are learning about spatial development and about symbolic communication in the spatial domain, including the use of spatial language, maps and models, and gesture. However, each intervention will likely need to be tailored to the developmental level of the students targeted, and to consider other instructional choices, such as embedding in a task or story context. Furthermore, each intervention should likely be evaluated in a small-scale controlled way before widespread curriculum changes are made. There are encouraging signs that this kind of research is increasing, both with young children (e.g., Casey, Andrews, Schindler, Kersh, Samper & Copley, 2008; Casey, Erkut, Ceder & Young, 2008; Ehrlich et al., 2006; Gentner, Loewenstein & Hung, 2007), and with college students (Feng, Spence & Pratt, 2007; Terlecki, Newcombe & Little, 2008; Wright, Thompson, Ganis, Newcombe & Kosslyn, 2008).
Footnotes

1 Note, however, that a large-scale randomized study would be necessary to give this optimism absolutely firm empirical support.

2 Arguably, these two kinds of coding represent egocentrism of different kinds, although Piaget did not distinguish the two meanings. In terms of a modern typology of spatial representation, Piaget believed that infants are dependent on response learning and/or local views or visual snapshots of their environment.
Table 1  *Five Reasons to Doubt the Existence of a Geometric Module*

1. Language does not play an essential role in the integration of feature and geometric cues.
   a) Non-human animals are able to use geometric and feature cues
   b) Adults’ feature use is not uniquely dependent on language
   c) 18 month old children can integrate geometric and feature cues in large spaces

2. A model of reorientation requires flexibility to explain variable phenomena
   a) The relative use of geometric and feature information depends on room size
   b) Flexibility to predict when overshadowing and blocking will or will not occur

3. Experience matters over short and long periods.
   a) Short-term training experiments demonstrate plasticity
   b) Rearing experiments demonstrate plasticity

4. Features are used for reorientation: Evidence against a recent two-step model.
   a) Reorientation in an octagon
   b) Features are used as landmarks for indirect orientation

5. Redefining the analysis of geometric information
   a) Not all kinds of geometry are used early in development
   b) Use of scalar and non-scalar cues by toddlers
   c) Use of scalar and non-scalar cues by mice
Table 2  Phenomena to be explained by any model of reorientation

1. Reorientation using relative length is easier than reorientation using angle size.

2. Reorientation relies more on features and less on geometry as enclosure sizes become larger.

3. Features are more likely to be used as children get older, but the improvement is continuous in larger rooms whereas, in smaller rooms, features are not used spontaneously until 6 years of age.

4. Feature use is enhanced by language training.

5. Feature use is enhanced by prior experience with features in a variety of situations.

6. Feature use is attenuated by both language interference and spatial interference.

7. Scalar information is easier to use for reorientation than non-scalar information.

8. Overshadowing and blocking are sometimes but not always observed with featural and geometric information—and potentiation is even possible.

9. Distal feature cues are used at a younger age than proximal feature cues.

10. Movement enhances the integration of feature and geometric cues.
References


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